Establishing the Pramana or Evidence:
I continuously offe my salutations to Lord Narayana who is absolute free from
blemishes, who possesses infinite auspicious attributes, who is distinct and superior to
Ksara, i.e. Jivas and Jadas, Akshara i.e godess Laksmi, and who is chiefly conveyed by
the sacred scriptures.
I shall establish the doctrine conveyed by the adjectives given to Narayana in the
above benedictory verse by quoting the authorities from the scripture and the
arguments not contradictory to the scripture for the comprehension of the deserving
persons in the order in which these adjectives are mentioned above.
Rigveda, Yajurveda, Samaveda and Atharvaveda, Mahabharatha, the entire
Pancharatra, Original Ramayana, the Puranas that are not contrary to these and all
such works that follow these are the sacred scripture. The other texts that are opposed
to these and indifferent to the tenets in these, are perverted texts. These do not help
to know Narayana.
Narayana could be known by his sacred scripture by those who are continuously
engaged in the study of these, who are devoted to Narayana, and who have the firm
faith in him.
Narayana cannot be comprehended by mere speculation or sense-perception or any
other such means. He can be comprehended by the sacred scripture only and by the
devoted persons only. Not in any other way.
“He who does not know the Veda etc., sacred scripture will not be able to
comprehend the Supreme God who possesses infinite attributes and who is
omniscient. The Veda teaches the Supreme God to enable the seeker to obtain the
liberation” – thus states the Taittiriya Sruti.
“The Knowledge of the Supreme God cannot be obtained by logic nor it can be
removed by the logic if already obtained. The knowledge of the Supreme God
imparted by a competent teacher will lead to the vision of the God.” – thus states the
Kathaka Sruti.
“Not the senses, nor the inferences help one to comprehend the God. Vedas alone
enable to comprehend him” – thus states Pippalada Sruti.
These statements cannot be treated as not authoritative. The Vedas are not the
compositions of any individual. “Itihasa and Purana” are the fifth Veda among the
Vedas. These are in agreement with the Vedas.
It cannot be contended that there can be no statement which is not composed by a
person. Because, if a statement that is not made by any individual is not accepted, that
is to say, if impersonal verbal authority is not accepted, then Dharma, Adharma etc.,
ethical and religious tenets, that are beyond sense perception will go without a source
of authority to convey them. However, these tenets i.e., Dharma, Adharma etc, that
are beyond sense perception are accepted by all religious and philosophical thinkers.
One who does not accept Dharma, Adharma etc., is not a religious and philosophical
thinker at all. Because, such a thinker’s philosophy will go without a subject and a
purpose. He cannot claim that teaching the absence of Dharma, Adharma etc., itself is
his subject, because, such a teaching will not foster people’s welfare. On the contrary,
if people come to believe that there is no Dharma, Adharma etc., to regulate them,
they will become more and more aggressive. This will result in a calamity to the
people.
Further, nothing is gained by a philosopher who teaches the absence of Dharma,
Adharma etc. He does not believe in the results beyond the world of sense perception.
Therefore, a philosopher who claims to teach the absense of Dharma, Adharma etc,,
has to tactly accept the purposelessness of his teaching and therefore, he is not a
philosopher at all.
Dharma, Adharma etc., tenets that are beyond sense perception cannot be
comprahended through the statements or compositions made by individual persons.
There is a possibility of ignorance and deception on the part of such persons.
To envisage an omniscient person to avoid the contingency of ignorance and
deception will not be proper. Because, such envisaging will involve the envisaging of
an omniscient person, his being free from the drawbacks of ignorance, and deception,
and envisaging that he composed the work considered as authority. This amounts to
postulating too many things, not observed elsewhere.
On the other hand if a revealed scripture is considered as the source of Dharma,
Adharma etc., nothing beyond this needs to be postulated.
The fact that the Vedas are revealed and not composed by any individual is self
evident since the Vedas are known to be without any author by a long tradition.
Inspite of such a long tradition if an author is postulated, then, it would be a
superfluous postulation. In view of this, if any author is not postulated, then
impersonal nature of the Vedas is a foregone conclusion.
It cannot be contended that Vedic statement also have an aothor, like any other
statement, because there is no tradition of authorlessness in case of other statements.
Similarly, no one can claim a statement to be a Vedic statement in the absence of such
a long tradition.
On the other hand the statements that are revealed to those to whom these
spontaneously reveal themselves cannot be considered as non-Vedic, because, these
do have the features of the Vedic statements known by the long tradition. These
portions do possess the attributes that are stated to be the attributes of Vedic seers.
Brahmanda Purana states: Those hymns are Vedas that are intuitively seen as Vedas
by those who possess not less than twenty attributes of an ideal person, who are
engaged in penance, and who know many hymns of the Vedas.
The validity of cognition is self evident. If its validity is to be confirmed by another
cognition, then, a third cognition will be needed to confirm the validity of the second
cognition and so on. This leads to infinite regress. The reason given earlier to point
out the authoritative ness of the Vedas were not intended to establish the validity of
the knowledge derived from the Vedas. But these were intended to remove certain
faults of thinking. For those whose thinking is free from the faults, the validity of
cognition is self-evident.
The contention that a cognition needs another cognition to confirm its validity only
when there is such a need, is not a normal requirement. Therefore, that there is no
infinite regress is not correct. For, this very need is an indication of a faulty thinking.
Such doubts arise only to locate the invalidity of cognition and it is invalidity that is
not self-evident but needs scrutiny. So far as validity of a cognition is concerned it is
self evident.
The contention that the Varnas i.e. letters are created when they are pronounced (and
perish soon after ) is not correct. Because, a Varna i.e letter is recognized as the same
that was heard on an earlier occasion. To consider Varnas as created will be contrary
to such recognition.
It cannot also be contended that the so called recognition is a mistaken notion due to
similarity. Because in this case even the well known instance of a recognition viz. “He
is the same Devadatta “ may have to be treated as a mistaken notion but not an
instance of recognition.
Even the Buddhist who claim everything to be momentary cannot dismiss the
recognition of Dik i.e Akasa as an illusion. Because, they have accepted Dik i.e. Akasa
as permanent. This is because, according to them Akasa is different from the five
Skandas (which only are momentary).
The contention of some Buddhists who claim even Diks i.e. different quarters of Sky
as illusory is also not correct, because, in that case even Vijnana and Sunya may have
to be treated as illusory.
The contention that the quarters East, West etc are envisaged on the basis of sunrise
etc., is also not correct, because, even in darkness one comprehends the quarters east,
West etc. An occasional confusion in respect of East, West etc, only is removed by a
reference to sunrise etc. Such a confusion can be pointed out even in respect of
Vijnana and Sunya also as these very concepts are opposed by others. Thus, the
quarter of Akasa are permanent (Therefore, the possibility of recognition has to be
accepted in respect of these and hence the possibility of recognition in respect of
Varnas cannot be questioned.).
Therefore, the eternality of Varnas and consequently of Vedas is established. The
Vedic sentences are recognized as the same sentences all along.
Anumana, Pauruseya etc. are not the source of knowledge of Dharma, Adharma etc.,
with out the support of Vedas. Dharma, Adharma etc. are not comprehended by
Anumana, human made sentences etc. These are comprehended only by not human
made Vedas. Therefore, all have to accept non-human made scripture.
The validity of Vedas and the validity of the knowledge obtained from it does not
depend upon any external cause. It is self-evident.
On the other hand the invalidity of erroneous knowledge is due to external causes
such as defective sense organs etc. Such a position has to be accepted, otherwise,
defective sense organs and defective inferences etc., would not be the grounds for
invalid knowledge. Not accepting them as the grounds for invalid knowledge is
against the experience.
A Sruti passage says: “O sage Virupa ! praise the Supreme God by the eternal speech
i.e. Vedas.
Another Sruti passage states : I Pray the Brahman who is the highest object to be
obtained by the liberated, both by the eternal and non-eternal speech.”
Paingi Sruti states: “Sruti i.e, Veda is eternal. Smriti and other scriptural literature in
non-eternal. Smriti and other scriptural literature in non-eternal.
Katyayana Sruti states: “Brahman is the highest object to be known. Sruti is the
highest means to know the Bnrahman. This Sruti is beginning less and eternal.
Brahman is also so. He cannot be comprehended without Sruti”.
Infinite are his glories. Each glory is infinite. The extent of Vedas is same as that of
Brahman in respect of space and time. Who the wise knows the full import of the
Vedas and who can give an exposition of Veda understanding its full import ?
The entire Veda consisting of Vidhi, Arthavada, Samkalpa, Prarthana etc., is eternal
and always of the same form. It is present in the mind of the Supreme God always in
the same form. At the commencement of each creation the Vedas are uttered by the
Supreme God in the same order, with the same letters, and with the same accent
without any change. The Vedas are only heard by all and therefore are designated as
Sruti. These are partly revealed to the seers who had heard them in the previous
births, by the grace of the Supreme God. These are seen by the Supreme God and
heard by others. Therefore, these are designated as Sruti and described as seen by the
ancients.
The mention of these, sometimes, as created should be taken in the sense of
manifested, as in the case of a soul.
Puranas that are intended to explain the import of the Vedas are only changed by the
changes in words, sequence etc., at the commencement of each creation. Therefore
these are non-eternal. However, their import will be same as in the previous
creation.
The Sruti passages that mention the creation of Vedas, state it from the point of view
of their manifestation. This may also be taken from the point of view of the secondary
abhimana deities. The non-eternality of Vedas is not at all intended by these passages.
There is no question of non-eternality of Vedas that are undoubtedly eternal. This is
stated in Brahmanada Purana.
If Vedas were not eternal, then, the use of special words Sruti, Veda etc, would not
have been justified.
These are called Vedas, because, these are always present; called Sruti, because, these
are heard by all, and called Amnaya, because, these are ever present in God’s mind in
the same way. This is stated in Varaha Purana.
But for the eternality of Vedas, the reference to them as seen would not have been
justified.
It is not justified to say that the letters, the Vedic words and Vedic sentences are not
eternal. Because, this are always present in God’s mind and the God is omniscient.
It is also not justified to say that it is only the impressions of these that are present as
in the case of Jar etc., objects present in the mind. Because, this will go against the
fact that there is a recognition of these. This is already stated.
The non-eternality of Puranas also is in the sense that their wordings are changed in
each creation.
Therefore, the letters that are manifested in the sound that is an attribute of Akasha,
the Vedas that are the sequencial arrangement of these are eternal.
It is not correct to argue that the Vedas are not the valid source for the knowledge of
the Supreme God since no sentence can convey an object that is just there. It is
observed that the objects mutually related are conveyed by the sentences.
One knows the meaning of the expressions “the mother”, “the father” etc., when
these are used with reference to the persons concerned introducing them by pointing
out to them by extending fingers etc.
He who insists that the sentences communicate only such entities that are related
with the activity has to realize that the so called activity is not related with any
further activity but still it is communicated by the sentence. If it is contended that an
activity need not be related to any other activity for being communicated, it is in the
case of other entities that they have to be related with some or other activity for
being communicated, then two standards are set for the communication by the
sentences, and this is accepting something more than needed.
Sentences such as “She is your mother”, “He is your father”, “You are beautiful” do
convey the entities that are not related to any activity but that are just there. It is the
experience of all that these sentences validily convey these objects.
A sentence has no other purpose than conveying its meaning. This is done in case of
communicating the entities that are just there.
A person proceeds to do something when he knows that it is desirable to him and
witdraws from something when he knows that it is undesirable to him. Therefore, all
sentences communicate siddha only.
It is acceptable by all schools of thought that grammar, etymology etc., communicate
facts only without relation to any activity. If these branches of knowledge are not
accepted as communicating, then, verbal communication itself becomes impossible.
This is stated in Naradiya purana.
The Vedas and the other sacred literature convey the supreme God Narayana who is
omniscient, creator of all, free from the defects and inadequancies, and Supreme.
Veda, Itihasa purana and other scriptures convey him. The other things i.e. Dharma
etc., are conveyed only to enable us to understand his glory.
The convention that the Vedas convey the identity between the Jivas and Brahman is
not tenable, because, there are no Pramanas to support this contention.
Further the contention that the difference between the Jivas and the Brahman is
already known by Pratyaksha and Anumana, and therefore the Sruti passages only restate
what is already known and hence are not Pramana is also not tenable, because,
one of the parties to the difference viz., Brahman cannot be known by Pratyaksha or
Anumana. Hence the Sruti passages that convey the difference are not mere
restatements of what is already known. Hence, these are Pramanas.
The contention that Ishvara can be known by inference is also no tenable, because
the absence of God also can be proved by inference.
The syllogism ‘the products earth, trees etc., that have no known producer have a
producer i.e, Agent because, these are products can be countered by a counter
syllogism ;the products earth, trees etc., do not have a producer, i.e, an agent,
because, the producer as envisaged by you is not acceptable to us.
If, for the second syllogism “akaryatva” is stated to be ‘Upadi’ i.e, a conditioning
factor, then we say that ‘Sarirajanyatva’ is Upadhi for the first syllogism.
If the difference is established by Pratyaksha and Anumana, then, the Sruti that is
supposed to convey abheda will be Apramana. Consequently, if Abheda Sruti is
Apramana because it is opposed to Pratyaksha and Anumana, then, there is no
question of Bhedasruti being treated only a anuvada or re-statement. A stronger
pramana will not be Anuvada; it will strengthen what is already conveyed by durbala
Pramana.
Though normally sruti is superior to Pratyaksha and Anumana, when these are
Upajivya the Sruti is not Pramana as against these. Because, these Upajivya Pramanas
provide the subject matter for Upajivaka Pramana i.e, Sruti.
Even for advaitin the subject matter of Abhada Sruti viz, Jiva and Ishvara are provided
by the Pratyaksha and anumana. While arguing for anuvaditva of Bheda Sruti
Advaitin stated that Ishvara is known by Anumana and Jiva is known by Pratyaksha.
Hence, if abheda is opposed to these Pramanas, then abheda Sruti cannot be Pramana.
As regards the Bheda between Isvara known through Anumana and Jiva known
through Pratyaksha, the very experience conveys the difference since every one
knows that Jiva is not Sarvakarta.
Agama that is in conflict with the experience of Saksin cannot be considered as
Pramana. In that case even the experience of Agamapramana may have to be treated
as Apramana.
Further, there being many Pramanas in a given case affirms its validity. When many
mention the same thing and it is also confirmed by observation, it results in the
affirmation of its validity.
When there is no dispute in respect of the contention made, then only, mentioning
of second and further Pramanas results in anuvada i.e., re-statement. In the present
case, the abhedavadins oppose bheda and therefore, there is a need to affirm
Bhedapramanya by Sruti.
When something is opposed to many Pramanas, then it is Apramana. This is observed
in the case of Suktirajata.
The contention that ‘Suktirajata is Apramana, not because, it is opposed to many
Pramanas but because, it is defective’ is not correct, because, whetever is opposed to
many Pramanas that is bound to be defective. In fact, the fact of its being defective is
detected by the opposition of many Pramanas.
The senses eye, ear etc., free from the defects constitute Pratyaksha, Tarka i.e
Anumana free from the fallacies is inference, the statements free from the defects are
Agama. The Skshijnana is called Anubhava. The defects are detected by the Superior
Pramanas. The auperiority of Pramanas is on two grounds viz.
1. Many Pramanas supporting the matter concerned
2. A Pramana being superior by its very nature.
Between these two criteria that which is superior by its very nature has to be
preferred to that of the support of many Pramanas, Upajivyatva etc., constitute the
grounds for the superior nature of a Pramana.
Conveying the objects as they are, constitutes Pramanya of Pramanas. This is
primarily done by the knowledge. The knowledge is of two types viz.
1. Anubhava i.e experience
2. Bahya i.e derived from outside
Between these two experience is superior.
Pratyaksha, Anumana and Agama constitute Anu-Pramana. Among Pratyaksha,
Anumana and Agama, the Agama is normally superior. However, when Agama is in
conflict with Upajivya Prtyaksha etc., then Upajivya is superior.
This Pararthanumana is stated to consist of Prtijna etc., three or more avayavas.
However, these are superfluous, since Upapatti i.e, the presentation of Hetu that has
Vyapti is the chief requirement and the statements of Pratijna, Hetu etc., are only
intended to present the Hetu that has Vyapti to the mind of the person who has to
infer. Without reminding the presence of Hetu that has Vyapti, the mere Pratijna
etc., statements will not help him. Depending upon the need of the person any one of
these avayavas can remind him of the presence of Hetu that has Vyapti. Therefore to
insist on three or more avayavas is superfluous.
Presentation of Hetu that has Vyapti constitute the chief element in the process of
reasoning to infer. This can be brought about by the statement of Pratijna alone, Hetu
with distant alone, Upanaya or Nigamana alone.
From experience it is clear that any one or two or three of these can lead to the
reasoning necessary to the inference depending upon the need of the person who is to
be enabled to infer.
Virodha i.e, syntactical incongruity, Adhikya i.e, extra words, Nyunata i.e,
incompleteness, Asangati i.e, absence of reciprocity, these are the defects of
reasoning. Virodha i.e, incongruity is of two types viz.
1. Svatah i.e, arising out of one’s own statement, action etc.
2. Anyatah i.e, pointed out by another Pramana. Jati is self contradiction.
These defects along with Samvada i.e acceptance of the disputed point, and Anukti i.e,
keeping mum, constitute nigrahasthanas.
Arthapatti is presumed something to justify what is already known but needs
justification.
Comprehension of similarity in something that was seen before by now seeing a
similar objects is Upamana.
Abhava is comprehended in two ways.
1. By Anubhava i.e, experience
2. By Yoga anupalabdhi i.e, non-comprehension of an entity even when
appropriate means to comprehend it are operating. The absence of bliss etc., is
comprehended in the first way and absensce of Jar etc., is comprehended in
the second way. The first way comprehending abhava is Pratyaksha while the
second is Anumana. Sometimes the absence of jar etc., entities is also
comprehended by Pratyksha.
Arthapatti and Upamana are varieties of Anumana.
Agama is of two types : Nitya i.e, eternal and Anitya i.e, created.
Pratyaksha is of three types viz, Isvara Pratyaksha, Yogi Pratyaksha and Ayogi
Pratyaksha. All these three arise by senses. The senses of Vishnu and Lakshmi are
eternal, of the nature of consciousness, and part of their very nature. The senses of
others are of two types viz.,
1. Senses that are part of their very nature.
2. Senses that are not part of their very nature.
The later are of three kinds: Daiva, Asura and Madhya.
Since the Aksa i.e, senses move towards the objects the knowledge obtained by them
is called Pratyaksha. The senses of God are Aksa in the primary sense since these
never perish. In the case of others as their senses develop through ego at the
commencement of creation and subside again during destruction, these are Aksa only
in secondary sense.
Sambhava is also a form of reasoning. Therefore, it is not a separate Pramana.
Anumana establishes things when duly supported by Pratyaksha and Agama. In other
cases, there is no certainty about its conclusions. This is all stated in Brahmatarka.
Now, the Pramanas that convey Bheda are Uipajivya and therefore, are superior.
Therefore, it is proper to take even the so called Abhada Sruti as conveying Bhada
only. If Bheda is not conveyed by Pratyaksha which is Upajivya Pramana here, then,
how can Bhada sruti be considered as anuvada, and if bheda is conveyed by
Prtyaksha, then, how can Abheda Sruti remain without being repudiated?
Unless the subject under reference is already conveyed by some other Pramana
earlier, the later Pramana will not be anuvada. If it is contended that the earlier
Pramana i.e, Pratyaksha is inferior, then, later Pramana i.e, bheda Sruti willnot be
anuvada at all. Therefore, bheda Srutis are superior.
In case the statements that are in conflict with all other Pramanas are considered as
authoritative and superior then, the purport of the statements such as ‘Idam agre
naiva kinchana asit’ etc. (There was nothing at the commencement of the creation. It
was all sunya. Therefore the Sunya is the cause of the world etc.) has to be taken as
authoritative and as the purport of the entire scripture, without any scrutiny, on the
ground that it has apurvata since it is opposed to all other Pramanas.
It cannot be argued that such a purport is opposed to reason and therefore cannot be
taken as authoritative, because, in the openion of those who consider the opposition
of other Pramanas as the ground of apurvata, the opposition of reason will be a merit.
In case the purport of the statements such as ‘Idam vaagre naiva kinchana etc., is
considered as supported by reason, then, it will be anuvada.
The correct position is, whatever is supported by other Pramanas that cannot be
denied. If it is contended that Bheda is not supported by Pratyaksha and Anumana,
then, Bheda sruti will not be Anuvada and will validly convey Bheda. In either case
Bheda Sruti are authoritative and superior.
It is not correct to say that when there are many Pramanas in a matter the second and
later Pramanas are not authoritative as these merely restate what is already conveyed.
It is observed that when there are many Pramanas in a matter , there is affirmation of
it. If such a position is not accepted, then, Abhyasa etc, will not determine the
authoritativeness. All have accepted the fact that Abhyasa determines the Purport.
In case Abhyasa is not accepted as a determinative of purport by the Advaitin, then,
the abhyasa i.e, repetition of ‘Tatvamasi’ nine times will have to be considered as
mere anuvada i.e, restatement but not as an authority in respect of Abheda.
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